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THE PROBLEM OF ANTI-TRUST REFORM 
For some inscrutable reason the Creator has equipped man with 
a mind that cannot quite keep up with the times. The course of unin-
tended events hurries our culture towards its unknown future and man 
belatedly brings up his intellectual resources. He sees with his mind 
as well as.with his eyes, and crowds his observation of things new un-
der the sun into customary categories. To him the emerging corpora-
tion is a person ; industrial relations concern masters and servants ; the 
work of the machine is manufacture; capitalism is a mere extension of 
handicraft. It was decades after the old order had felt its shock be-
fore the Industrial Revolution was even a na~e. However strange the 
new phenomenon may be, man has an old name for it. 
Man, the actor-on-the-spot, unlike the leisurely historian a-top of 
Olympus, must meet events head-on. As a new technology, a novel 
thing called business, an unusual way of life, a strange trend of thought 
emerges, the familiar gradually gives way to the unfamiliar. The 
familiar wears the obvious aspect; the unfamiliar appears but a little re-
vealed,-an implication in an acceptable usage, a potentiality which want 
and occasion must quicken into life. Change comes by stealth, and its 
novelties may win a tacit acceptance before their strangeness is noticed; 
it is not for the men of the times to read between the lines of current 
happenings and to discover there impending social arrangements. When 
eventually novelties are too omni-present to be any longer denied, and 
untoward things seem to be going forward, an alarum is raised over 
departures from the ·accepted folk-ways. The people demand that some-
thing be done to domesticate the turbulent forces into instruments of 
order and well-being. To that end there must be a program; the pro-
gram must be made out of ideas; the only ideas its makers can use are 
those they possess-and those which belong to common-sense have 
emerged out of the stress and strain of crises which are gone. 
Such a crisis, with its demand for control, appeared in America 
towards the end of the nineteenth century. The revolution which had 
gained momentum with the passing of the decades was no longer to be 
ignored. The increase of scientific knowledge had revealed untold stores 
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of natural wealth; the march of invention had banished the craft and 
brought the factory, established the machine-process and quantity pro-
duction, and erected an industrial order upon mechanical power. The 
use of credit, accountancy, the corporation, and kindred devices had 
placed the activities whereby livings are made under the control of 
business. The extension of the market, the art of salesmanship, and the 
division of labor had transformed a homogeneous society made up of 
almost self-sufficient farms and its complement of local trade into an 
intricate-even if disorderly-articulation of industries. In this devel-
opment business units came to be of unprecedented size and power. 
Small manufacturers and traders, who saw their enterprises crowded to 
the walls, demanded the aid of the government against "big business." 
The public, who distrusted size as much as they feared e.xtortionate 
price, raised a hue and cry for "trust busting." It was generally agreed 
to be high time to "do something about it." 
In the emergency the voice of the people found expression in legis-
lation. Accepted ideas were converted into a public policy which was 
incorporated into the law of the land. The be-ali and the end-all of 
state interference was an enforced competition between rival firms. A 
long experience of petty trade had demonstrated that the rivalry of 
seller with seller and buyer with buyer insured efficient service, high 
quality, and fair price. The interests of a party to trade-seller, 
lender, or employer-was balanced by the interests of the other party-
buyer, borrower, or employee; the desire of the individual was checked 
by the rivalry of others for the same laborers, investments, or market. 
The action of "competitive forces," throtfgh the operation upon the 
market of "the law of demand and supply," kept industries organized, 
eliminated the inefficient, granted survival to the fit, insured to labor 
satisfactory conditions of work and fair wages, and gave protection to 
the consumer. Trades were to be kept open-and a self-regulating 
economy could be depended upon to effect all that the business system 
should do. The dominant idea was in accord with the legal notion of 
freedom of contract, the prevailing philosophy of individualism, and 
the common-sense of the times. So the Sherman Act appeared upon 
the statute books in 1890 ; the Clayton and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Acts were added in 1914; and in the years stretching away from 
the mid-eighties to the nineteen-hundred-and-tens a number of states 
passed statutes which dubbed understandings among the firms of an 
industry, "conspira<;ies," and outlawed combinations "in restraint of 
trade." 
In its translation into law the very purpose of the anti-trust policy 
was compromised. The ideas of economic theory and of common-sense 
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had to make their peace with the language of legislation and the process 
of litigation. The end of "enforced competition" was to be secured by 
the means of prohibiting such agreements as were technically known to 
the courts as "conspiracies in restraint of trade." Such concepts were 
of the law rather than of economics or business; their vitality was to 
be found in precedents authoritatively set down in the reports of a 
pre-industrial era. They were to be invoked in suits in criminal law 
or in equity; conviction of offenders, or decree of dissolution, awaited 
proof by rules of evidence contrived for getting at *e tr-uth in quite 
alien inquiries; the litigation had to go fonvard, step by step, under a 
formal code of procedure never designed to be applied to issues in 
economic control. The cases were heard before benches of judges, ex-
perienced in the discipline of the law rather than business, far better ac-
quainted with Cooley on Blackstone than with Adam Smith and Alfred 
Marshall, and much more at home with code pleading than with social 
control. It is hardly strange that questions of fact and of policy were 
subordinated to the antecedent-and even .irrelevant-questions of de-
corous procedure, and that ingenious attorneys found ways to "wear 
the cases out" before the real issues were ever raised. The course of 
the law is unhurried, and its decisions just; it can do more than outlaw 
specific practices which go beyond legislative tolerance. A business en-
terprise may use its more nimble ways to employ alternative devices, as 
yet free from condemnation by the courts, to achieve its acquisitive ends. 
It is small wonder that the statistics for a period of forty years present 
a futile picture of law enforcement. A handful of "criminals" sent to 
prison, a little more than one hundred decrees, and a little less than two 
million dollars in fines fall far short of what the traffic in "conspiracies 
in restraint of trade" could bear. On its face the record is a glorious 
tribute of respect paid by men of business to the very spirit of the anti-
trust acts. 
But the roots of failure are far more fundamental than the use of 
the device of litigation to give effect to an economic policy. Modern 
industrialism has come with startling suddenness ; it has been too power-
ful and too turbulent to be subdued by legislation and court decree; 
its phenomena have been too unusual to be crowded into familiar for-
mulas of public control. The universe of petty trade was one sort of 
place; the world of big business is quite another. In the small town 
the trader could keep one eye on his customers, another on his rivals, 
and both on his own shop. The custom accorded by his neighbors was 
a matter of loyalty; desertion to a rival demanded its explanation. Costs 
were for the most part direct and furnished a basis for price; the quan-
tity of output was easily adjusted to changes in demand. As improve-
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ments were gradually made in methods of production, time allowed an 
easy accommodation. In the great industry eyes alone will not do; a 
knowledge of the state of the industry, of the future intent of custom-
ers, and of the hidden plans of rivals must be the basis of sound policy. 
The decisions of today may determine the capacity to produce for years 
to come; yet, in an impersonal market, a demand may suddenly go to a 
rival, or pass on to another ware. In adapting the capacity-to-produce 
of an industry to changes in the market, a far neater adjustment is de-
manded than the separate judgments of competing firms can effect. If 
they all respond directly to market trends, the whole trade will be un-
done. In many lines of business overhead costs have become more 
significant than out-of-pocket expenses; costs are high or low as fixed 
charges are spread over a small or a large output. The market de-
termines the unit cost of production rather than the unit cost the market. 
As discovery and invention bring changes in the technical processes of 
production, the firms in an industry must introduce new methods or be 
undone. In the great industry an uncontrolled competition must play 
the role of industrial organizer under conditions which were never an-
ticipated. 
As a result the operation of competition presents new problems. 
There is still the chance that rivals may get together and by conspiracy 
impose unreasonable prices upon their customers. But quite as important 
is the incidence of an enforced competition in waste and disorder. A 
series of isolated judgments by the executives of rival businesses does 
not exorcise plant waste, eliminate surplus capacity, and articulate neat 
establishments into orderly industries. The tyranny of overhead costs,-
which click on with the clock,-and of over-capacity,-which demands 
to be used,-may lead to an over-done competition which drives prices 
below the necessary costs of production. In th!!ir wake may come a 
plague of bankruptcies which falls alike upon the inefficient and the 
efficient. The persons who look to the industry for support may have 
to accept irregular employment or wages too low to sustain a decent 
standard of life. Above all, so long as unity in action is restraint of 
trade, there is little chance to have answered-or even to get raised-
the larger questions which affect the conduct of an industry and con-
cern all who have a stake in it. A poliO.y for the industry is fornm-
lated-so far as there is any policy-as an incidental by-product of a 
multitude of isolated judgments about private business affairs. 
Hence it is that the anti-trust la~vs present a challenge. The stat-
utes themselves, the public policy which they embody, and the economic 
theory they voice need to be considered afresh. In the nineties it was 
thougRt that competition could fail only by ceasing to be; that the one 
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evil to be feared was the toll to be taken of the consumer in monopoly 
price. Today we know that the institution called competition is a 
group of arrangements of man's invention; that it works in different 
industries with quite different degrees of success; and that it holds po-
tentialities alike for order and for disorder. We know that in its ac-
tual operation there ca.n be too much, as well as too little, of so good 
a thing; that it imposes the costs of industrial maladjustment upon 
investors and managers, upon laborers and consumers alike. We are 
not yet ready-if ever we shall be--to substitute a ready-made economic 
system for the prevailing arrangements ; most of us would retain the 
rivalry of firm against firm as an incentive to efficiency. But we have 
need to rewrite our anti-trust laws to the end that the competition for 
custom may be carried on within industries which have been subdued to 
order. 
The revision of the statutes presents no easy problem. The de-
mand for change comes from the necessities of an industrial world; the 
phrases in the acts are remnants from a local society which is gone. 
Our industries are not alike; banking, railroads, power, and radio-
broadcasting have already been accorded their own schemes of control. 
The technologies of our various trades, ........ meat packing, building, min-
ing, retailing, .and whatnot,-have their own compulsions with which 
schemes of public control must come to grips. The simple uniformity of 
the older acts may have to give way to an accommodation of public 
oversight to the varying necessities of different trades. Most important 
of all, a conflict of ends must be resolved. If industries are to become 
orderly, if the office of bankruptcy is to be limited to an elimination of 
the unfit, if laborers are to enjoy steady employment and living wages, 
there must be a measure of central direction. The formal control must 
certainly extend to capacity, probably to output, and possibly to price. 
If consumers are to be protected, if potential wealth is to become a 
source of actual plenty, if industries are to be made instruments of 
national well-being, there must be neither an anti-social restriction of 
output nor a monopoly element in price. Here is a conflict of values 
which calls for constructive thought. To revise the statutes in such 
a way as to serve the interests of investors, managers, and laborers 
without withdrawing protection from .consumers demands a clear vision, 
full knowledge, and neat adjustmen{? The anti-trust laws are a decla-
·ration that business is affected with a public interest; the moral value 
of this commitment must not be lost. 
The plain truth is that the rewriting of the statutes is the beginning, 
not the end, of the problem. It may be asserted that no more is in-
tended than to confer a legal sanction upon an exchange of infor~ation 
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or upon an agreement in merely nominal matters among rivals. But 
behind make-believe and pretense, the significant questions stand out 
in clear-cut relief. If we are determined to come to grips with the 
disorder which attends an undirected competition, we must control if 
not output and price, at least the factors upon which they depend. As 
our current arrangements go, the formal direction of our businesses 
lies with the parties who derive from them profits. It is evident that 
public and legislature are not going to allow them to manipulate output 
and price to their own pecuniary advantage. If the way of order is to 
be purposive, an adequate check upon profit-making must be contrived. 
This may be found either in according to consumers a share in manage-
ment or in setting up a regulatory commission. Each alternative in-
volves the contrivance of new inventions to serve the ends of social 
control. 
So it is that the revision of the anti-trust laws presents a funda-
mental challenge. The appearance of accountancy, the corporation, 
and the machine created a fault-line between the technology of indus-
try and its organization. An economic order in which the productive 
processes belong to big business, and the arrangements for control to 
petty trade cannot abide. Out of the ideas of the day a scheme for the 
orderly direction of the great industry must be devised. We can no 
longer make the industrial system an instrument of well-being by in-
voking the ideas which the people of the eighteen-hundred-and-nineties 
borrowed from a small town culture. 
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